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THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY EXCEPTION TO THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Rachel Simon*
I. INTRODUCTION
1

Edward Snowden made Americans dramatically more aware of
government surveillance—its very existence, as well as the danger it
presents to civil liberties. The advantages of surveillance for law
enforcement are obvious,2 yet the population remains wary of a
government inching ever closer to Big Brother.3 That said, outrage is
muted by the reality that most of us have never felt its adverse effects
directly. Storied criminal defense attorney and law professor Mark
Denbeaux (“Professor Denbeaux”) is an exception. Although his story
is rare today, it foreshadows events that attorneys around the world
imminently face.
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1
Edward Snowden is a former NSA contractor who revealed in June 2013 to The
Washington Post and The Guardian that the NSA has been mass-collecting data on
millions of American citizens’ phone calls. Both newspapers won Pulitzer Prizes for
the revelations; Snowden was charged with three federal offenses, including violation
of the 1917 Espionage Act. See Ed Pilkington, Guardian and Washington Post Win Pulitzer
Prize for NSA Revelations, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2014, at A1, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/apr/14/guardian-washington-postpulitzer-nsa-revelations.
2
See, e.g., Criminal Complaint at ¶¶ 9–15, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 13-10200
(D. Mass. Apr. 21, 2013), 2013 WL 3231316 (explaining how Boston Marathon bomber
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was caught using private surveillance footage).
3
See, e.g., Cloaks Off, ECONOMIST (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.economist.com/
news/international/21588890-foreign-alarm-about-american-spying-mounting-soundand-fury-do-not-always-match-0; Steven Erlanger, Outrage in Europe Grows Over Spying
Disclosures, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/07/02/world/europe/france-and-germany-piqued-over-spyingscandal.html?pagewanted=all; David Meyer, Academics Band Together to Plead for Online
Privacy, GIGAOM (Jan. 3, 2014), http://gigaom.com/ 2014/01/03/academics-bandtogether-to-plead-for-online-privacy/; Frank Pasquale, Focusing on Core Surveillance
Harms, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2013/08/focusing-on-core-surveillance-harms.html.
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Professor Denbeaux has defended Southern civil rights activists,
Black Panthers, and Vietnam War protestors.4 He has served as a
forensics expert before Congress and innumerable federal courts,
including at the trial of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh.5
More recently, Professor Denbeaux has assumed representation of
several detainees held as “enemy combatants” at the Military Detention
Center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (“Guantanamo”). Consequently,
the United States federal government (“government”) monitors
Professor Denbeaux’s communications—private and public, intimate
and mundane, whether with his family or, most significantly, with his
clients.6 Unfortunately, Professor Denbeaux is not alone; the
government appears to be monitoring the communications of all the
defense attorneys who represent Guantanamo detainees.7
This kind of surveillance presents a two-fold problem. First,
government eavesdropping on attorney-client communications makes
an unequivocal farce of our justice system, and undercuts the
constitutional protections embodied in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. Second, despite the enormity of the invasion of
Professor Denbeaux’s privacy, only two federal courts have even
recognized that an attorney can state a Fourth Amendment claim for
government eavesdropping on attorney-client communications.8
Neither case was successful on the merits. Thus, there is simply no
impetus for the government to stop its illegal intrusions anytime soon.
Other scholars note that government monitoring of attorneyclient communications immediately erodes the attorney-client
privilege,9 directly violates the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel,10 and likely vitiates the Fifth Amendment right to
4

Mark P. Denbeaux: Seton Hall Law Faculty, SETON HALL LAW, http://
law.shu.edu/Faculty/fulltime_faculty/Mark-Denbeaux.cfm (last visited January 5,
2015).
5
Id.
6
Interview with Mark Denbeaux, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School
of Law (November 20, 2013).
7
See infra Part II; see also Spencer Ackerman, Guantánamo Hearings Halted Amid
Accusations of FBI Spying On Legal Team, THE GUARDIAN (April 14, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/14/guantanamo-bay-hearing-haltedfbi-spying.
8
See Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (M.D. Fl. 2012) (attorney and client
sufficiently stated a Fourth Amendment violation based on unlawful police
surveillance at the police station to survive a 12(b)(6) motion); Lonegan v. Hasty, 436
F. Supp. 2d 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same).
9
Kristen V. Cunningham & Jessica L. Srader, The Post 9-11 War on Terrorism . . .
What Does It Mean for the Attorney-Client Privilege?, 4 WYO. L. REV. 311, 312 (2004).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Tamar R. Birckhead, The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and
the Uncertain Future of the Right to Defend, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 43 (2006).
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due process.11 However, these collective rights—privilege, due process,
and right to counsel—may only be invoked by the client being
prosecuted. Likewise, where prior scholarship discusses the Fourth
Amendment implications of government spying on attorney-client
communications, it focuses on violations of the client’s constitutional
rights.12 This focus is facially sound, considering that violations of the
Fourth Amendment are typically remedied by suppressing evidence
obtained by its violation;13 suppression of evidence has no remedial
value as to the illegal intrusion on an attorney’s privacy. Indeed,
constitutional jurisprudence largely ignores or rejects the notion that
an attorney has Fourth Amendment rights separate and apart from her
client when it comes to monitoring attorney-client communications.14
This Comment argues that there is not, and should not be, a
“criminal defense attorney” exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Specifically, the government should not be permitted to monitor a
private citizen’s personal communications without a warrant simply
because he is representing a criminal defendant—even if that
defendant is accused of terrorism. Because the Judiciary’s response to
such egregious constitutional violations is patently insufficient, this
Comment submits that Congress must legislate to keep the Executive
in check. Part II provides evidence of government surveillance of
attorney-client communications, using Professor Denbeaux’s
experience at Guantanamo to frame the issue. Part III outlines the
legality of such surveillance, insofar as Congress has passed laws
allowing government surveillance of attorney-client communications
in certain, limited contexts. Part IV sets forth the current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and assesses what rights attorneys have to
11

U.S. CONST. amend. V; Cunningham & Srader, supra note 9, at 335.
See, e.g., Teri Dobbins, Protecting the Unpopular from the Unreasonable: Warrantless
Monitoring of Attorney Client Communications in Federal Prisons, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 295,
298 (2004); Ellen S. Podgor & John Wesley Hall, Government Surveillance of AttorneyClient Communications: Invoked in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
145, 155 (2003); ACLU, REGARDING EAVESDROPPING ON CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEYCLIENT COMMUNICATIONS (66 Fed. Reg. 55062) (2001), available at https://www.
aclu.org/racial-justice_prisoners-rights_drug-law-reform_immigrants-rights/coalitioncomments-regarding-eaves.
13
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963) (extending
exclusionary rule to evidence found as a consequence of the initial constitutional
violation, also known as “fruit of the poisonous tree”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (announcing exclusionary rule whereby unconstitutionally obtained evidence
is inadmissible at trial).
14
See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 562–68 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that eavesdropping on attorney-client communications violates
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but ignoring potential Fourth Amendment
violations).
12
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private communications.
Part V explains the ways in which
government monitoring of attorney-client communications violates
the Fourth Amendment rights of the attorney. Part VI argues that
Congress must legislate to provide both a cause of action for aggrieved
attorneys and an incentive for the government to stop illegally spying
on private citizens. Part VII concludes the Comment.
II. EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT SPYING
As of June 2013, it is beyond question that the United States
federal government has been spying on its citizens for decades.15 The
government publicly justifies its mass surveillance programs on
grounds of national security and counterterrorism.16 Considering that
Guantanamo is where the government houses alleged “high-value
detainees” suspected of terrorism,17 it is less than surprising to learn
that various federal agencies have been spying on daily activities at
Guantanamo since its inception. As detailed infra, what is perhaps
more surprising is that such surveillance is occurring after the federal
government has been admonished for secretly videotaping suspected
terrorists’ meetings with their attorneys, on no fewer than four prior
occasions.
Before suspected 9/11 terrorists were sent to Guantanamo, they
were held at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn,
New York. In March 2003, the Department of Justice Office of the
Inspector General (“DOJ OIG”) reported on pervasive breaches of
private meetings between attorneys and their clients detained at the
MDC:
In total, we found more than 40 examples of staff videotaping
detainees’ attorney visits. On many videotapes, we were able
to hear significant portions of what the detainees were telling
their attorneys and sometimes what the attorneys were saying
as well. It appeared that detainees’ attorney visits were
15

See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps In To User
Data Of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, at A1, available at http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
16
See In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Production of
Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. 13-109 (FISA Ct. August 29, 2013), 2013 WL
5741573.
17
See, e.g., DONALD RUMSFELD, KNOWN AND UNKNOWN (2011) (“I wanted transfers
of detainees to Guantanamo to be kept to a minimum—to only individuals of high
interest for interrogation who posed a threat to our nation’s security.”); Memorandum
from Donald Rumsfeld to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander, U.S.
Central Command (Apr. 21, 2003) (declassified in part Jul. 9, 2010) (“We need to stop
populating Guantanamo Bay with low-level enemy combatants. GTMO needs to serve
as an [REDACTED] not a prison for Afghanistan.”).
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recorded intentionally. . . . In sum, we conclude[] that audio
taping attorney visits violated the law and interfered with the
detainees’ effective access to legal counsel.18
Although the DOJ OIG clearly found that this conduct violated federal
law19 and the detainees’ constitutional rights, it is unclear whether any
remedial action was taken. It appears that the government instead
attempted to circumvent statutory and constitutional constraints by
having clandestine agencies, rather than municipal policemen,
conduct the furtive recording of attorney-detainee meetings.
One notorious incident of a clandestine agency’s picking up the
baton is the 2002 CIA recording of interrogations of detainee Abu
Zubaydah.20 The recordings comprised ninety-two videotapes.21 One
“initial purpose” of recording the interrogations was to create “a
record of Abu Zubaydah’s medical condition and treatment should he
succumb to his wounds and questions arise about the medical care
provided to him by [the] CIA.”22 That said, “[a]nother purpose was to
assist in the preparation of the debriefing reports.”23 Indeed, the CIA
listened to the audio from the videotapes of the interrogations to
prepare debriefing reports.24 After public revelation of the tapes’
existence, the CIA’s Director of Clandestine Operations ordered the
destruction of all ninety-two tapes in November 2005.25
A second incident surfaced in 2010, when the CIA admitted that
it had twice misinformed the Department of Justice about whether it
possessed recorded interrogations of Ramzi Binalshibh.26 The CIA had
previously claimed that it destroyed all recordings of Binalshibh
around the same time it destroyed the ninety-two recordings of Abu
Zubaydah in 2005.27 In 2010, however, the Agency admitted that it still
18

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SUPPLEMENTAL
REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN
DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK (2003), available at http://www.
justice.gov/oig/special/0312/chapter3.htm#B.
19
Id. (noting violation of 28 C.F.R. § 543.13(e)).
20
CIA OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SPECIAL REVIEW – COUNTERTERRORISM
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEMBER 2001–OCTOBER 2003), available
at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/CIA000349. pdf.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Dan Eggen & Joby Warrick, CIA Destroyed Videos Showing Interrogations, WASH.
POST (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2007/
12/06/AR2007120601828_pf.html.
26
US Confirms Interrogation Tapes, AL-JAZEERA (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/americas/2010/08/201081853357268955.html.
27
Id.
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possessed two videotapes and one audiotape of Binalshibh’s
interrogations.
A third notorious incident of the United States’ conducting
interrogation recordings involved the worldwide, broadcasted
recording of Omar Khadr, a Canadian who was held at Guantanamo
since the age of sixteen.28 In February 2003, Canadian Security
Intelligence Service officials interrogated Khadr in Guantanamo. In
July 2008, Khadr’s defense attorneys publicly released recordings of
the interrogation made by the recording equipment in the attorneyclient meeting room.29 A Special Agent for the United States Naval
Criminal Investigative Service (“NCIS”) watched and listened to the
Khadr recordings one week after they were made and reported on the
intelligence gathered during the sessions.30 Ultimately, seven hours of
interrogations of Khadr conducted over four days at Guantanamo
appeared in an edited, feature-length documentary film.31
While the MDC recordings were generally of private attorneyclient meetings, the Guantanamo recordings were limited to
interrogations, where a detainee’s attorney may or may not have been
present. That all changed in January 2013, when the discovery that an
“external body” was surreptitiously monitoring and censoring the
Military Commission hearings at Guantanamo, superseding the
presiding judge’s supposed sole authority to do so, emerged.32 The
external body censored Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s Learned
Counsel, David Nevin, while he recited the title of a motion that
contained mostly unclassified information pertaining to CIA dark site
prisons. The Military Commission’s presiding judge, Army Colonel
James Pohl, taken by surprise, stated:
[I]f some external body is turning the commission off under
their [sic] own view of what things ought to be, with no
reasonable explanation because [there] is no classification
on it, then we are going to have a little meeting about who
turns that light on or off.33
28

Key Events in the Omar Khadr Case, CBC NEWS (Sep. 30, 2012), http://www.cbc.
canews/politics/story/2012/09/30/omar-khadr-timeline.html.
29
Id.
30
Report of Investigative Activity, AIR FORCE OFFICE of SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, 60
(Feb. 24, 2003), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20080711
khadr.pdf.
31
4 Days inside Guantanamo, YOU DON’T LIKE THE TRUTH, http://www.youdont
likethetruth.com (last visited January 5, 2015).
32
Unofficial Transcript of the KSM et al. (2) Hearing Dated Jan. 28, 2013 from
1:31 PM to 2:46 PM at 1445:14–1446:7, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/
MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
33
Id. at 1446:2–7.

SIMON(DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/19/2015 5:46 PM

COMMENT

353

Within one week, Judge Pohl seemed to not only accept having an
external body eavesdrop on, and censor, the Military Commission
hearings, but also even defend the notion on the government’s behalf.
Specifically, Judge Pohl challenged one defense attorney for Abd alRahim al-Nashiri by asking, “[d]oes it surprise you that the United
States government has all sorts of ability to monitor conversations
throughout the world?”34
Soon after the government’s display of courtroom eavesdropping
capabilities, defense counsel for Guantanamo detainees learned that
the meeting rooms assigned to them for private conversations with
their clients had been bugged with convincingly disguised
microphones for surreptitious audio recording.35 The microphones,
made by Louroe, are hidden in realistic smoke detector shells
mounted on the meeting rooms’ ceilings.36 According to Louroe,
these microphones are “often used in law enforcement interview
rooms,” because they are “sensitive enough to capture a suspect’s
comments even when whispered.”37 That said, a public relations
manager of Louroe specifically shunned clandestine usage of its
products at Guantanamo: “If I’m monitoring audio covertly or
surreptitiously, then it is 100% illegal. Not only have I broken the law,
but I can’t use any of that audio as evidence in a court case.”38 Public
relations spin notwithstanding, however, there is no debate that the
microphones in the attorney-client meeting rooms at Guantanamo are
specifically designed for monitoring conversations that the speakers
wish to keep confidential.

34

Unofficial Transcript of the Al Nashiri (2) Hearing Dated Feb. 5, 2013 from
9:01 AM to 9:56 AM at 1556:3–5, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/
MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
35
See generally MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., SPYING ON ATTORNEYS AT GTMO:
GUANTANAMO BAY MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP (2013) [hereinafter DENBEAUX ET AL., SPYING ON ATTORNEYS],
available at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/
upload/spying_on_attorneys_at_GTMO.pdf.
36
Transcript of the KSM et al. Hearing Dated Feb. 12, 2013 from 1:00 PM to 2:37
PM at 1984:5–1985:11, 2021:4–2022:5, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/
MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
37
Joseph Goudlock, Where Are You Using Louroe Electronics?, LOUROE ELECTRONICS
BLOG (Sep. 27, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.louroe.com/blog.php.
38
Cameron Javdani, Legal Use of Audio, LOUROE ELECTRONICS BLOG (Sep. 6, 2011,
4:51 PM),
http://louroe.com/blog.php.
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Following the public discovery of the listening devices, Army
Colonel John Bogdan ordered the audio recording equipment in
attorney-client meeting rooms to be disconnected, but not
dismantled.39 In addition to the secret microphones, however, each
attorney-client meeting room also hosted at least two video cameras.
Colonel Bogdan confirmed that there was one infrared camera
mounted on the wall opposite “from where the detainee would be
locked in when there was not a meeting,” and another encased, pointtilt-zoom camera mounted in a corner.40 At least one of the video
cameras in each of the attorney-client meeting areas is so sensitive that
“from the distance they are in the cell, most definitely” they are capable
of zooming to read “very tiny writing” on a document used during an
attorney-client discussion.41 It is questionable whether installing,
maintaining, and using video cameras with such powerful lenses
exceeds the ostensible security needs at Guantanamo.
On March 25, 2013, personnel from the Office of Military
Commissions, Office of Chief Defense Counsel (“OCDC”) discovered
that there had been corruptions to and loss of electronic files
containing attorney work-product, attorney-client communications,
and other privileged and confidential documents stored on the
OCDC’s shared “O-drive.”42 The O-drive was the exclusive repository
of all defense attorney work at Guantanamo; only those with the
defense privilege were supposed to have access, and there was nowhere
else for attorneys to save their work. OCDC personnel also discovered
that the defense attorneys’ internet activity, which itself revealed
confidential work-product and client communications, was being
monitored and reviewed.43 Several defense teams reported these
intrusions to the OCDC, Military Commission, and Department of
Defense staff.44
On March 26, 2013, the defense team of detainee Ibrahim al Qosi
alleged that the government conducted a search of 540,000 of its
emails,45 in addition to allowing unrestricted access to all defense files
39

Transcript of the KSM et al. Hearing Dated Feb. 13, 2013 from 10:28 AM to
12:02 PM at 2243:1–4, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/ MilitaryCommissions.
aspx.
40
Id. at 2227:7–2228:19.
41
Id. at 2239:11–2240:8.
42
Defense Motion to Abate Proceedings at 1, No. CMCR-13-001, AE155A
(U.S.M.C. Apr. 13, 2013).
43
Id. at 3.
44
Id. at 6–9.
45
Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Appropriate Relief to Stop the
Unauthorized Disclosure of Privileged Defense Counsel Communications and Other
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in response to court orders, Freedom of Information Act requests,
congressional inquiries, and search requests from other governmental
agencies.46 The government responded in April 2013 that no one in
the Office of the Chief Prosecutor or on the Privilege Review Team
reviewed the content of any privileged or otherwise confidential
defense communication.47 Nonetheless, in May 2013, Colonel Karen
Mayberry, OCDC Chief Defense Counsel for Military Commissions,
certified that she had investigated these allegations with the
government offices and agencies involved and found them to be true.48
Colonel Mayberry uncovered further that: (1) IT and other staff
were neither “trained in, [n]or in any way concerned with, attorneyclient confidences or privilege[s]”; (2) staff regularly turned defense
files “over to the requester without any scrutiny as to whether the
results contain[ed] privileged or confidential files”;49 (3) results turned
over “without limitations on the personnel authorized to view the
information”;50 (4) past assurances over the sufficiency of securing
privileged and confidential documents using encryption and password
protection “were wrong”;51 and, amazingly, (5) staff from the various
agencies involved had been discussing the security and confidentiality
problems since at least 2008—i.e., had been aware of the problems and
simply failed to agree on the appropriate solution.52 As a result,
Colonel Mayberry ordered all defense counsel, both military and
civilian, to stop communicating client information via the provided
email accounts, as well as to stop storing files on any provided drives.53
In April 2014, the author personally witnessed the most egregious
incident of government interference in the attorney-client relationship
at Guantanamo to date. On April 13, 2014, defense counsel for the
five co-defendants in United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, et al., who
are accused of planning and executing the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
jointly filed an emergency motion notifying the Military Commission
that two FBI agents had interviewed the defense security officer
(“DSO”) working for defendant Ramzi bin al Shibh’s team on Sunday,
April 6, 2014 and compelled him to sign a “preventative cooperation
Electronic Defense Records at 2, No. CMCR-13-001 (U.S.M.C. 2013).
46
Id. at 3.
47
Declaration of Col. Karen Mayberry, No. CMCR-13-001 (U.S.M.C. May 2, 2013).
48
Id.
49
Id. ¶ 7.
50
Id.
51
Id. ¶ 5.
52
Id. ¶ 5–14.
53
In April 2014, Col. Mayberry advised the author personally that her directive
remains in effect.
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agreement” that included a non-disclosure provision.54 A DSO is a
legal team’s advisor and liaison to government agencies on security
issues. In plain English, bin al Shibh’s DSO agreed to act as an ongoing
FBI informant and not tell anyone about it, including the rest of his
legal team. The DSO had a change of heart and informed his
supervisors of the FBI agreement on April 9, 2014.55
The scope of the FBI investigation remains unknown, and the
government’s substantive responses remain redacted.56
Media
observers of the April hearings reported that the FBI questioned the
DSO about alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s
(“KSM”) defense counsel, specifically inquiring about how an
unclassified manifesto57 penned by KSM was released to the media in
January.58 In other words, the FBI was purportedly investigating KSM’s
defense attorney in lieu of investigating KSM himself. Although not
providing affirmative information on the scope of the FBI
investigation, the government has shot down the media reports as
mistaken, stating that the FBI investigation does not pertain to that
disclosure.59
Even to a law student, it was painfully obvious that no one—
prosecution, defense, or judge—knew how to proceed when faced with
the FBI derailment. Indeed, Judge Pohl frequently asked both parties
how they thought the hearings should proceed in order to devise a
workable plan moving forward.60 Defense counsel argued that, as the
subjects of an ongoing FBI investigation, they were conflicted insofar
as their interests in defending against that investigation might conflict
with their interests in defending their clients.61 Further, they could not
54

Emergency Joint Defense Motion to Abate Proceedings and Inquire into
Existence of Conflict of Interest
Burdening Counsel’s Representation of Accused, No. AE292 (U.S.M.C. Apr. 13, 2014).
55
Id.
56
See, e.g., Amended Order Re Emergency Joint Defense Motion to Abate
Proceedings and Inquire into Existence of Conflict of Interest Burdening Counsel’s
Representation of Accused, No. AE292QQ (U.S.M.C. Dec. 16, 2014).
57
Ryan J. Reilly, Mastermind of the Sept. 11 Attacks Wants to Convert His Captors,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/
01/14/khalid-sheikh-mohammed-manifesto_n_4591298.html.
58
Spencer Ackerman, 9/11 Military Court Adjourns Trial until June amid FBI Spying
Probe, THE GUARDIAN (April 17, 2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/apr/17/911-court-guantanamo-bay-adjourn-trial-june-fbi-spying.
59
See Public Government Response to Defense Emergency Motion, No. AE292H
(U.S.M.C. Apr. 14, 2014).
60
See generally Transcript of the KSM et al. Motions Hearing Dated April 15, 2014
from 9:15 AM to 11:13 AM, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/Military
Commissions.aspx.
61
Id.; see Emergency Joint Defense Motion, supra note 54.
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know whether members of their defense teams had signed nondisclosure agreements with other agencies after being likewise
approached, and such a lack of knowledge prevented them from
advising their clients on waiver of the conflict.62 As such, Judge Pohl
issued an order on April 15, 2014 requiring all current and former
defense team members to disclose only to their lead counsel any
disclosures/agreements with any federal agencies.63 Lead counsel was
instructed to then make the ethical call on what needs to be disclosed
to the MC to resolve a conflict of interest. Defense counsel was further
instructed to submit proposed orders stating what evidence and
witnesses they want the Military Commission to subpoena to inquire
into the FBI issue by close of business on Wednesday, April 16, 2014.64
The government denies any knowledge of the FBI investigation.65
That said, a former prosecution team member, Joanna Baltes, now
serves as Chief of Staff to the Deputy Director of the FBI.66 At a
minimum, this relationship raises questions about the prosecution
team’s knowledge of the FBI investigation. In an abundance of
caution, therefore, Judge Pohl issued an order on Wednesday, April
16, 2014, appointing a Special Review Team to review all matters
pertaining to the investigation and Special Trial Counsel to represent
the United States in order to keep the prosecution team led by General
Martins insulated.67 The Special Review Team’s conclusions were later
found insufficient to address all issues raised by the defense, and were
not considered in the Military Commission’s December 2014 order (1)
compelling the FBI to maintain a log of those who access the files of
the (still sealed) investigation at issue, (2) requiring disclosure of that
log to the Military Commission upon request, and (3) ensuring that
the FBI investigative file remains sequestered from the government
prosecution team moving forward.68
In close, the Military Commission has twice been forced to set
aside its docketed schedule and deal with unexpected intrusions by
clandestine agencies’ spying on attorney-client communications. As of
62

Emergency Joint Defense Motion, supra note 54.
Interim Order Re Emergency Defense Motion to Abate Proceedings and
Inquire into Existence of Conflict of Interest Burdening Counsel’s Representation of
Accused, No. AE292C (U.S.M.C. Apr. 15, 2014).
64
Id.
65
Transcript of the KSM et al. Motions Hearing Dated April 14, 2014 from 9:15AM
to 9:51 AM at 7766, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.
Aspx.; see Public Government Response, supra note 59.
66
See Transcript of the KSM et al. Motions, supra note 60, at 7789–90.
67
See Interim Order, supra note 63.
68
See Amended Order, supra note 56.
63
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December 2014, it is undisputed that the government recorded
attorney-client communications at Guantanamo via audio and video
recording,69 that the government deleted only defense attorney files
on local computers,70 and—most significantly—that the government
surveillors gave the illegally obtained evidence to the government
prosecutors.71
III. LEGALITY OF GOVERNMENT SPYING
Congress has passed legislation allowing government spying on
attorney-client communications in certain, limited circumstances.
These laws purport to place strict limits on when law enforcement is
permitted to spy on attorney-client communications, in recognition of
the sacrosanct place attorney-client communications hold in American
law. This section outlines the ways in which the government has
statutory authority to legally and constitutionally intrude on attorneyclient communications, as well as the ways in which the judiciary has
attempted to hold the executive branch to the legislature’s directives.
As discussed in Part V, infra, the judiciary has been largely unsuccessful
at reigning in the Executive.
A. The Federal Wiretap Act
Before 1967, the police did not need to get a warrant to listen-in
on conversations occurring over phone company lines. But in that
year, the Supreme Court decided two cases which made clear that
unrestricted electronic surveillance could violate the Fourth
69

Even the prison’s lawyer and head warden admitted to audio surveillance. See
Chris McGreal, Guantanamo Commander Admits Listening Devices Eavesdropped on Lawyer
Meetings with Clients, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2013), available at http://www.
rawstory.com/rs/2013/02/18/guantanamo-commander-admits-listening-devices-eve
sdropped-on-lawyer-meetings-with-clients/ (“The prison’s lawyer, Captain Thomas
Welsh, told the court he discovered the room was fitted with hidden microphones early
last year and reported it to the then warden, Colonel Donnie Thomas, to seek
assurances that meetings between the accused and their lawyers were not being spied
on. Bogdan said he was not informed when he took over. He told the court that the
FBI was in control of the room until 2008 and that he has since discovered that the
bugs were accidentally disconnected in October during renovations but then secretly
reconnected by an unnamed intelligence service two months later, suggesting they
were still in use.”).
70
See Daphne Eviatar, Lawyers Say Gitmo Computer Problems Make Defending 9/11
Accused Impossible, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2013, 5:30 PM), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/daphne-eviatar/lawyers-say-gitmo-compute_b_3806590.html
(noting deletion of defense attorney files).
71
See Peter Finn, Guantanamo Dogged by New Controversy after Mishandling of E-Mails,
WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2013), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 2013-0411/national/38458944_1_defense-attorneys-defense-lawyers-defense-counsel (noting
that “hundreds of thousands” of defense emails were turned over to the prosecution).
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Amendment. In Katz v. United States (“Katz”), the Court held that
eavesdropping counted as a Fourth Amendment search requiring a
warrant.72 In Berger v. New York, the Court held that New York’s wiretap
statute violated the Fourth Amendment because the statute: (1) was
authorized for too long a time; (2) failed to require a specific
description of the crime being committed or the persons or things to
be searched; and (3) neither required notice to the target nor a
showing of special circumstances to abrogate the notice requirement.73
Congress enacted the Wiretap Act in 1968 to ensure that any electronic
surveillance by federal agents complies with the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment post-Katz and Berger.74 Generally, the Wiretap Act
“criminalizes and creates civil liability for intentionally intercepting
electronic communications without a judicial warrant.”75
Section 2516 of the Wiretap Act provides for the interception of
wire, oral, and electronic communications by federal agencies upon an
application to a federal judge showing that the interception may
provide evidence of federal crimes.76 At a minimum, the application
must state all facts justifying the applicant’s belief that an order should
be issued77 and the time period of the requested interception;78 the
judge may require additional evidence.79 The judge may authorize the
interception if there is probable cause to believe that: (1) an individual
72

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
388 U.S. 41, 59–60 (1967).
74
See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972) (“Much
of Title III was drawn to meet the constitutional requirements for electronic
surveillance enunciated by this Court.”).
75
Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2001).
76
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2012). The judge may also grant orders authorizing
interception of communications that may provide evidence of other enumerated
offenses under Title 18, including: (1) Presidential and Presidential staff assassination,
kidnapping, and assault (§ 1751); (2) hostage taking (§ 1203); (3) destruction of
aircraft or aircraft facilities (§ 32); (4) threatening or retaliating against a federal
official (§ 115); (5) Congressional, Cabinet, or Supreme Court assassination,
kidnapping, and assault (§ 351); (6) wrecking trains (§ 1992); (7) production of false
identification documents (§ 1028); (8) fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other
documents (§§ 1546, 2516(1)(c), 2516(1)(p)); and (9) crimes related to alien
smuggling (§ 2516(1)(p)).
77
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (1998). The statement should include (1) details about
the offense that is being or is about to be committed, (2) a description of the nature
and location of the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (3) a
description of the type of communications to be intercepted, and (4) “the identity of
the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be
intercepted.” Id. It must also state whether “other investigative procedures have been
tried and failed, or why [such procedures] reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed
if tried or [why such procedures would] be too dangerous.” Id. § 2518(1)(c).
78
Id. § 2518(1)(d).
79
Id. § 2518(2).
73
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is committing, has committed, or is about to commit one of the
enumerated offenses; (2) communications concerning that offense
will be obtained through the interception; (3) the place of
interception is “leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used” by
the surveillance target; and (4) “normal investigative procedures have
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”80 The Wiretap Act restricts
applicants for eavesdropping warrants to “publicly responsible officials
subject to the political process” so that “should abuses occur, the lines
of responsibility [would] lead to an identifiable person.”81 Finally, the Act
provides that its enumerated remedies and sanctions are “the only
judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations”82
involving interception of wire and electronic communications. As
discussed in Part V, infra, constitutional violations of the Wiretap Act by
federal actors are remedied in a Bivens action.
The Wiretap Act provides a number of exceptions to its
application, including when a party consents, when the target is
foreign rather than domestic, and when a service provider rather than
an agency is conducting the monitoring.83 The Act also allows for
warrantless surveillance in the event of an emergency, which involves
the “(i) immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any
person, (ii) conspiratorial activities threatening the national security
interest, or (iii) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized
crime.”84 Significantly, the Wiretap Act provides specific protections
for privileged communications, which maintain their privileged
character regardless of interception.85 In recognition of the longestablished evidentiary rules of privilege, United States v. Turner made
clear that telephone conversations are “privileged” under the Wiretap
Act only if they are “privileged other than by virtue of their character
as private telephone conversations.”86

80

Id. § 2518(3)(a)–(d).
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 2 Stat. 2112 United States
Code Congressional and Administrative New, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 1968,
Volume 2, p. 2112, Senate Report No. 1097. See also United States v. Cihal, 336 F. Supp.
261, 265 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
82
18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(c) (1998) (emphasis added).
83
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2008).
84
18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1998).
85
18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1968).
86
528 F.2d 143, 155 (9th Cir. 1975).
81
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While privileged communications are inadmissible at trial, law
enforcement officers are not entirely prohibited from intercepting
telephone conversations between attorney and client under the
Wiretap Act. Section 2518(5) requires that electronic eavesdropping
be conducted “in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception,”87 including
privileged
and,
presumably,
constitutionally-protected
88
communications. Nevertheless, law enforcement officers who have
lawfully established a wiretap can monitor attorney-client
communications to the extent necessary to determine that the attorney
is not participating in criminal activity along with the subject of their
investigation.89 This is known as the “crime fraud exception.”90
Under the crime fraud exception, law enforcement officers may
legally monitor attorney-client communications under the Wiretap
Act.91 For example, in United States v. Johnston, federal Drug
Enforcement Agents tapped the phone of defendant Johnston, an
attorney, in investigating a marijuana distribution ring involving
Johnston’s client.92 The Agents heard Johnston help the drug-dealing
client create a false alibi, and Johnston was subsequently indicted and
convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana.93 Johnston argued
that the wiretaps violated the Wiretap Act’s minimization requirement
because the inculpatory conversations were privileged attorney-client
communications. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, upholding the District
Court’s ruling that because the content of the conversations was
unlawful criminal advice and not lawful legal advice, the conversations
were not privileged and thus not subject to the minimization
requirement.94

87

18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1998).
See, e.g., United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1169 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“Section 2518(5) requires the government to minimize the interception of privileged
communications.”); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(“[o]nce the parties have been identified and the conversation between them is
determined to be nonpertinent or privileged, monitoring of the conversation must
cease immediately.”).
89
See United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 869–70 (5th Cir. 1978).
90
See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 575 (1989), vacated in part on other
grounds, 905 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1990).
91
See, e.g., United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir. 1994) (dismissing
attorney’s Fourth Amendment grievance regarding government-sanctioned burglaries
of his firm to obtain incriminating documents implicating him and a client in
bankruptcy fraud).
92
146 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir. 1998).
93
Id.
94
Id.
88
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Although Johnston was in fact guilty of the conspiracy offense, the
Johnston case illuminates the danger that the government’s violation of
the Wiretap Act may be excused so long as it guesses correctly about
an attorney’s participation in a crime. That is, the government was
monitoring Johnston’s private and privileged conversations and only
learned that such conduct did not constitute a violation of the Wiretap
Act when a court retrospectively determined the legal status of the
conversations as non-privileged. Had Johnston been innocent and
given only legal advice, the government’s monitoring without any
minimization procedures would have remained a Wiretap Act
violation.95
Of course, the Wiretap Act was enacted before cellphones and
smartphones. The Wiretap Act thus provides less assistance today, in
that its drafters did not anticipate the growing popularity of wireless
communications. As will be seen, statutory amendments, as well as
advancements in communications technology, resolved this issue by
establishing recognizable privacy interests for parties to wireless
conversations.96
B. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (Stored Communications Act)
The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), codified at 18 U.S.C. §
2702 et seq., seeks to protect records held by communications service
providers, such as phone companies, internet service providers
(“ISP”), webmail providers, instant message or text providers, or
bulletin board sites. In relevant part, the provision states:
(a) Prohibitions.—(1) a person or entity providing an
electronic communication service to the public shall not
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
communication while in electronic storage by that service;
and (2) a person or entity providing remote computing
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any
person or entity the contents of any communication which is
carried or maintained on that service . . . ; and (3) a provider
of remote computing service or electronic communication
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer
of such service . . . to any governmental entity.97
In order to get a communications provider to turn over records
beyond basic subscriber information, the government either has to get
95
96
97

18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1998).
See generally Dobbins, supra note 12, at 295.
18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2008).
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a search warrant or a special court order.98 Section 2703 allows
disclosure of an electronic communication (1) pursuant to a warrant,
without notice to the subscriber, or (2) pursuant to an administrative
warrant or court order, if the communication is over 180 days old, and
with notice to the subscriber. Section 2703(d) states that a court order
may issue “only if the governmental entity offers specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records
or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”
Section 2707 provides a civil action for any person aggrieved by
the knowing or intentional violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2702.99 Section
2707(b) states that relief may be granted in the form of preliminary,
declaratory, or equitable form, that both compensatory and punitive
damages are available, and that attorney’s fees and costs may also be
granted. While Section 2707(e) provides three “complete” defenses to
violations of the SCA,100 Section 2708 provides that “the remedies and
sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and
sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.”101 As with
constitutional violations of the Wiretap Act, constitutional violations of
the SCA by federal agents are remedied in a Bivens action, discussed in
Part V, infra.
Under the SCA, then, attorney-client communications may be
monitored by the government if they are turned over by the content
provider (e.g., Google, Yahoo, Hotmail) pursuant to a warrant or court
order issued upon an epistemic, reasonable belief that the
communications pertain to an ongoing criminal investigation. Thus,
theoretically, if the government believes a criminal has communicated
with her attorney about the crime being investigated, then the
government
could
potentially
receive
all
attorney-client
communications under the SCA. Indeed, the attorney may never know
that the government has obtained her attorney-client communications
pursuant to the SCA,102 and certainly cannot take steps to redress the
attendant privacy violation.
98

18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2009).
18 U.S.C. § 2707 (2002).
100
The three complete defenses are: (1) good faith reliance on a court warrant or
order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization;
(2) good faith reliance on a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer . . .
; or (3) good faith determination that . . . this title permitted the conduct complained
of. Id. § 2707(e).
101
18 U.S.C. § 2708 (1986) (emphasis added).
102
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2009).
99

SIMON (DO NOT DELETE)

364

1/19/2015 5:46 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:347

C. Bureau of Prisons Regulation, 28 C.F.R. 501.3
On October 30, 2001, then United States Attorney General John
Ashcroft authorized a new Bureau of Prisons rule (“BOP Regulation”)
that allows warrantless monitoring of all communications between
specified federal inmates and their attorneys when the Attorney
General himself has a reasonable suspicion that the particular inmate
“may use communications with attorneys or their agents to further or
facilitate acts of terrorism.”103 The BOP Regulation expressly applies
to communications that fall within the attorney-client privilege.104
On April 11, 2002, Lynne Stewart (“Stewart”), a criminal defense
attorney, was arrested for providing material support and resources to
a terrorist organization as a result of communicating with her terrorist
client. Stewart represented Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, leader of
terrorist organization the Islamic Group, who was convicted for the
1993 World Trade Center bombings.105 The government’s case against
Stewart developed from monitoring her jailhouse communications
with Rahman pursuant to the BOP Regulation. Trial testimony showed
that during prison visits to Rahman in May 2000 and July 2001, Stewart:
(1) violated the BOP Regulation by distracting guards and acting as a
decoy so that Rahman and his interpreter, Mohammed Yousry, could
covertly discuss issues related to Islamic Group governance, strategy,
and policy;106 (2) provided “cover” for Yousry to read letters and other
messages from third parties to Rahman and for Rahman to dictate
outgoing letters to Yousry;107 and (3) conveyed to a Reuters reporter
Rahman’s politically charged statement that he was “withdrawing his
103

28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2003). The Attorney General may rely on information
from the head of a federal law enforcement or intelligence agency. Id.
104
Id.
105
Indictment, United States v. Ahmed Abdel Sattar, Yassir Al-Sirri, Lynne Stewart
& Mohammed Yousry, No. 02-395 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://
news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/ussattar040902ind.pdf.
106
See Transcript of Stewart and Yousry at 17, Prison Visit with Rahman (May 20,
2000), available at http://www.lynnestewart.org/5201.pdf (“Stewart: ‘I am making
allowances for them looking in at us and seeing me never speaking and writing away
here while you talk Arabic.’”).
107
See Transcript of Stewart and Yousry at 49–51, Prison Visit with Rahman (May
19, 2000), available at http://www.lynnestewart.org/5191.pdf (Stewart stating that she
can “get an Academy Award” for her performance covering Yousry’s private
conversations with Rahman). See also Trial Testimony of Lynne Stewart at 7764–66
(Oct. 27, 2004), available at http:// www.lynnestewart.org/transcripts/102704.txt
(testifying to comments made to Yousry during May 19, 2000 prison visit).
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support” for the cease-fire in Egypt that had been upheld by factions
of the Islamic Group since 1997.108 Her conviction garnered
widespread attention, highlighting the tension between a defendant’s
right to unfettered communication with his lawyer and the everincreasing reach of the federal government post-9/11.109 To date,
Stewart is the only terrorist’s lawyer who has faced criminal charges.110
The BOP Regulation presents many of the same problems as the
Wiretap Act and SCA. Specifically, it lacks procedural safeguards
beyond the Executive’s own discretion and, further, lacks either ante
or post hoc judicial oversight. Thus, while Stewart was guilty of aiding a
terrorist,111 there may be other attorneys whose communications are
being monitored who are wholly innocent. All in all, the BOP
Regulation does not appear to be a necessary tool in the government’s
war on terror, given that these communications could be monitored
pursuant to a court order under the Wiretap Act,112 FISA,113 or the
Patriot Act.114 It does, however, make the unfettered monitoring of
attorney-inmate communications by the government that much easier
to accomplish.

108

See Trial Testimony of Esmat Salaheddin at 5573–75 (Sept. 13, 2004), available
at http://www.lynnestewart.org/transcripts/091304.txt (testifying that Stewart
conveyed Rahman’s statement regarding the cease-fire to a reporter); Trial Testimony
of Lynne Stewart, supra note 107, at 7810, 1816 (stating that Salaheddin’s testimony
was accurate).
109
See, e.g., Michael Powell & Michelle Garcia, Sheik’s U.S. Lawyer Convicted of Aiding
Terrorist Activity, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2005, at A01 (“Stewart’s case became a litmus
test for how far a defense attorney could go in aggressively representing a terrorist
client without crossing the line into criminal behavior.”); Victoria Ward, U.S. Civil
Rights Lawyer Guilty of Aiding Terrorism, PRESS ASSOC., Feb. 11, 2005 (reporting Stewart’s
conviction); Civil Rights Lawyer Lynne Stewart Convicted of Aiding Terrorists, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO, Feb. 11, 2005 (discussing Stewart’s conviction).
110
See Laurel E. Fletcher et al., Defending the Rule of Law: Reconceptualizing
Guantanamo Habeas Attorneys, 44 CONN. L. REV. 617, 673 n.150 (2012).
111
While Rahman was certainly a dangerous terrorist seeking to commit additional
violence, further context reveals that Stewart’s prosecution was at least as much for her
political support of dissidents like Rahman as it was for her criminal acts. See generally
Deborah L. Rhode, Editorial, Terrorists and Their Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at
A27; Birckhead, supra note 10, at 21; Laurel E. Fletcher et al., supra note 110, at 673
n.150.
112
The Wiretap Act is available because the communications pertain to a national
security interest. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1998).
113
Indeed, Rahman and Stewart’s communications were monitored pre-2001
pursuant to a FISC order. See Birckhead, supra note 10, at 21.
114
The Patriot Act is available because the communications pertain to terrorism.
50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2014).
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D. The USA PATRIOT Act
The USA PATRIOT Act (“Patriot Act”) plays a special role in this
Comment, given its enactment as a counterterrorism-based
surveillance statute.115 Generally, Section 215 of the Patriot Act
(“Section 215”) allows government surveillance of communications if
they are connected to terrorism. Specifically, Section 215 allows the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to order any person or entity
to turn over “any tangible things” if the FBI “specif[ies]” that the order
is “for an authorized investigation . . . to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”116 It requires the FBI
to provide a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe the tangible things are relevant to the authorized
investigation and to implement minimization procedures “applicable
to the retention and dissemination.”117
Nonetheless, Section 215 expands the FBI’s domestic spying
power, insofar as the FBI (1) need not show probable cause, nor even
reasonable suspicion, that the person whose records it seeks is engaged
in criminal activity, (2) need not have any suspicion that the subject of
the investigation is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, and
(3) can investigate United States citizens based, in part, on their
exercise of First Amendment rights.118 The FBI can investigate noncitizens based solely on their exercise of First Amendment rights.119
Significantly, those served with Section 215 orders are prohibited from
disclosing that fact to anyone else.120
50 U.S.C. § 1861(e) provides that “[a] person who, in good faith,
produces tangible things under an order pursuant to this section shall
not be liable to any other person for such production. Such production
shall not be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege in any other
proceeding or context.”121
While this provision protects the
confidentiality of privileged material, there is no practical redress for
a person whose privacy is intruded upon by another’s compliance with
Section 215. If, for example, one’s doctor were handed a Section 215
115

Indeed, its very name, USA PATRIOT Act, is an acronym for the “Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.” Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
116
50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2006).
117
Id. § 1861(b)(1)–(2).
118
Section 215 authorizes investigations of U.S. persons that are “not conducted
solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.”
Id. § 1861(a)(1) (emphasis added).
119
Id.
120
Id. §§ 1861(c)(2)(E), 1861(d)(1).
121
Id. § 1861(e) (emphasis added).

SIMON(DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/19/2015 5:46 PM

COMMENT

367

request for one’s medical records, the doctor could turn them over
without fear of any liability despite the fact that the materials ostensibly
retain their privileged status. There would be no liability for the doctor
and no redress for the patient, however, since the patient could not be
informed that either the Section 215 request, or the doctor’s
compliance with it, even existed.122
A person violates Section 215 by either intentionally engaging in
electronic surveillance that is not authorized by the Patriot Act or by
knowingly or even negligently disclosing such surveillance.123 A
violation of Section 215 is punishable by a “fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.”124 It
is a complete defense if the defendant was an investigative officer
whose surveillance was conducted pursuant to a search warrant or
court order.125
As discussed further in Part V, infra, the complete secrecy of
Section 215 monitoring and the complete defense of acting pursuant
to a court order raise serious concerns for attorneys. First, the judicial
check on the Executive’s use of Section 215—the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Courts (“FISC”)126—has been wholly ineffective insofar as
the FISCs appear to merely rubber-stamp all Section 215 requests in
the name of national security. On these grounds, the FISC held that
Section 215 authorizes ubiquitous surveillance of American citizens’
telephone and email metadata to sniff out suspected terrorists, which
in turn does not violate the Fourth Amendment.127 If the FISC will
authorize widespread and non-targeted surveillance in the name of
counterterrorism, it appears that the FISC would readily authorize
targeted surveillance of an attorney representing a person suspected
of terrorism. Second, that attorney would never know that her

122

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(c)(2)(E), 1861(d)(1) (2006).
50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1)–(2) (2010).
124
Id. § 1809(c).
125
Id. § 1809(b).
126
FISA is the acronym for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 U.S.C. ch.
36), a domestic statute that prescribes procedures for the physical and electronic
surveillance and collection of “foreign intelligence information” between “foreign
powers” and “agents of foreign powers” (which may include American citizens and
permanent residents suspected of espionage or terrorism). See 50 U.S.C. §1801(b)
(2010). FISA establishes Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts to provide judicial
review of surveillance conducted under FISA’s authority to ensure constitutional
compliance; any surveillance conducted pursuant to FISA must first be approved by a
FISC. Id. § 1809. FISC proceedings are secret, ex parte, and non-adversarial; only the
government submits evidence, after which the FISC judge approves or denies the
surveillance.
127
See In re Application, supra note 16.
123
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communications are being monitored pursuant to a Section 215
order.128 Professor Denbeaux only asserts to know that his private, nonGuantanamo-related communications are being monitored because
government prosecutors have made statements and taken actions that
would be impossible or inexplicable in the absence of surreptitious
monitoring. With the current FISC’s rubber-stamp approval, Section
215 represents a sweeping authorization for the government to
monitor the content of any person’s private communications, without
his or her knowledge or consent, so long as the government can show
some connection to terrorism.129 Without knowing the surveillance is
occurring, the target cannot seek redress for the Fourth Amendment
violation such monitoring represents.
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: AN ATTORNEY’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Fourth Amendment grants the “right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”130 Security in one’s papers
includes the right to privacy in all personal correspondence;131 security
in one’s person includes the right to privacy as to one’s bodily integrity
and freedom of movement.132A search is unreasonable, and the Fourth
Amendment violated, when a government actor either (1) physically
intrudes on a protected area or item to obtain information or
evidence,133 or (2) violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to a protected area or item.134

128

50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(c)(2)(E), 1861(d)(1) (2006).
In a public address, President Obama recently promised that federal agencies
will now begin to limit their mass surveillance under Section 215 to “only” those persons
“two steps removed” from known terrorists. By this formula, because Professor
Denbeaux communicates with his clients in Guantanamo (who are suspected of
terrorism), and this author communicates with Professor Denbeaux, the government
is likely monitoring the content of this author’s personal communications as part of
its counterterrorism efforts. President Barack Obama, Remarks on Signals [NSA]
Intelligence Programs at The White House (Jan. 17, 2014).
130
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
131
See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 529 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[T]ruly private papers or communications, such as a personal diary or
correspondence . . . lie at the core of First and Fourth Amendment interests.”).
132
Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 51
(1981).
133
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (re-establishing physical
trespass as a Fourth Amendment search).
134
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(establishing that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when a state violates a
person’s subjective expectation of privacy, where that expectation is one that society
deems objectively reasonable).
129
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Historically, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relied on
property law, finding violations only where the government committed
a physical trespass on a protected area or item.135 A paradigm shift
occurred in Fourth Amendment analysis with the 1967 case of Katz.136
In Katz, the police placed a listening device on the outside of a phone
booth. Reasoning that the Fourth Amendment “protects people not
places,”137 the Katz Court held that the device violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of the caller—notwithstanding the lack of a
physical trespass into the phone booth—because it infringed on the
caller’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan argued for a two-pronged test
to find a Fourth Amendment violation, wherein a defendant must (1)
manifest a subjective expectation of privacy, which is (2) one that
society deems objectively reasonable.138 In Katz, the Court found that
the caller manifested a subjective expectation of privacy by closing the
phone booth door.139 Justice Harlan acknowledged that a phone booth
“is a temporary private place whose momentary occupants’
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized [by society] as
reasonable.”140 Because Katz’s conduct satisfied both the subjective
and objective prongs of what later became known as the Katz test, the
Court found that the government’s conduct violated Katz’s Fourth
Amendment rights.141 The Court expressly adopted the Katz test in the
1979 case of Smith v. Maryland (“Smith”).142
For decades following Katz, Fourth Amendment cases turned on
the right to privacy. Then, in the 2012 case of United States v. Jones
(“Jones”),143 the Court ruled that Katz had supplemented, rather than
replaced, the earlier trespass standard. In Jones, law enforcement
officers attached a GPS device to the exterior of Jones’ car without
Jones’ knowledge or consent and tracked his movements for twenty-

135

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (finding no trespass, and thus
no Fourth Amendment violation, where wiretapping occurred on the outside of a
building); see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (“Detectaphone” on
outside of building not a Fourth Amendment violation); On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747 (1952) (speaker’s consent to presence of informant precluded trespass,
required to find Fourth Amendment violation).
136
389 U.S. at 347.
137
Id. at 351.
138
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
139
Id. at 352.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 359.
142
442 U.S. 735, 739–40 (1979).
143
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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eight straight days.144 Since the intrusion on the vehicle—a common
law trespass—was for the purpose of obtaining information, the Court
ruled that it was a Fourth Amendment search and unreasonable absent
a warrant.145 The Court relied on Jones’ “trespass” reasoning in Florida
v. Jardines146 to rule that police cannot bring a drug-detection dog to
sniff at the front door of a home without probable cause and a warrant.
In the aftermath of Jones, if a government action is designed to
obtain information, then either a trespass or a “Katz invasion of
privacy” will render that action a search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, an attorney may rely on either physical trespass or
a Katz invasion of privacy in asserting a violation of her Fourth
Amendment rights.
A. Limits of the Fourth Amendment—Public vs. Private Papers
This Comment addresses government surveillance of an
attorney’s person, as well as his papers, via surreptitious electronic
recording. As to papers, the Fourth Amendment does not protect that
which is voluntarily exposed to the public.147 Instead, it is primarily
concerned with protecting that which comprises a person’s intimate
life. For the purposes of constitutional protection, therefore, it is
paramount to distinguish between public and private papers.
In the 1976 case of United States v. Miller (“Miller”), the Supreme
Court held that citizens have no privacy expectation in their bank
records, insofar as the information kept in these papers is voluntarily
conveyed to the banks in the usual course of business.148 Applying similar
reasoning, the Court held in the 1979 case of Smith149 that Americans
have no expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial; as
a result, a subpoena on telephone companies to turn over pen registers
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.150 Bank and telephone
records, therefore, are public papers for constitutional purposes.
Smith and Miller are distinguishable from the instant situation on
a number of grounds. First, the validly gathered information in those
cases did not comprise private communications that have recognized
constitutional and evidentiary protections. Here, both attorney-client
conversations, as well as notes and emails drafted by the attorney in the
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id. at 948.
Id. at 954.
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
Id.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id. at 745–46.
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course of his legal representation, are afforded attorney-client and
work-product privilege in addition to protection under the Sixth
Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel that bars
interception of attorney-client communications.151
Second, the
information in Smith and Miller was voluntarily turned over to thirdparties, who in turn gave it to the government; here, the government
is illegally taking the information without the parties’ knowledge or
consent.152 Thus, neither Smith nor Miller provides a barrier to recovery
by an attorney whose private communications are monitored without
his knowledge or consent. If anything, these cases serve to underscore
that, where information is not voluntarily turned over to a third
party—indeed, where measures have been taken to guard against the
possibility that third parties will obtain that information—the
information retains its Fourth Amendment privacy protections.
B. Limits of the Fourth Amendment—Personal Rights
United States v. Payner (“Payner”) is often cited for the proposition
that attorneys do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy distinct
from their client’s. This reliance on Payner is misplaced. Payner held
that constitutional rights are personal and may not be vicariously
asserted.153 In Payner, the IRS broke into a banker’s briefcase to steal
documents about defendant Payner’s fraudulent transactions. The
Supreme Court held that the defendant had no recourse for the
knowingly illegal intrusion into the banker’s briefcase because the
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in either (1)
another person’s effects/papers or (2) the information he had
voluntarily turned over to the banker.
The Payner Court did not, however, hold that the banker had no
recourse for the violation of his personal constitutional rights, which is
the precise issue this Comment addresses. Said another way, Payner
precludes Professor Denbeaux’s client from seeking to suppress emails
stolen from Professor Denbeaux’s account, but does not preclude
Professor Denbeaux himself from asserting a violation of his own
Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, Payner cannot be used to deny that
an attorney has Fourth Amendment rights distinct from his client’s.

151

See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (preventing defendant
from consulting with counsel during overnight recess violates Sixth Amendment);
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 563 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“[G]overnmental incursions into confidential lawyer-client communications threaten
criminal defendants’ right to the effective assistance of counsel.”).
152
See infra Part II; see also supra note 7.
153
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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C. Limits of the Fourth Amendment—Privacy Expectations in Jail
An incarcerated person has a lesser expectation of privacy than a
free man.154 It does not necessarily follow, however, that attorney
communications with an incarcerated client receive lesser Fourth
Amendment protection than with an un-incarcerated client. Indeed,
the Supreme Court expressly stated in Lanza v. New York (“Lanza”) that
“[e]ven in jail, or perhaps especially there, the relationship which the
law has endowed with particularized confidentiality must continue to
receive unceasing protection.”155
More recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York in Lonegan v. Hasty (“Lonegan”) held that “in the
prison setting, attorney-client communications generally are
distinguished from other kinds of communications and exempted
from routine monitoring.”156 Lonegan involved the taping of suspected
9/11 terrorists’ attorney-client meetings at the Brooklyn, New York
MDC.157 The government argued that the presence of video cameras
in the meeting area and the fact that the detainees were terrorism
suspects rendered the defense attorneys’ subjective expectation of
privacy objectively unreasonable.158 The Lonegan court disagreed,
holding that “the existence of robust protections for attorney-client
communications makes [the attorneys’] expectation of privacy in their
conversations with Detainees reasonable.”159 Indeed, the Lonegan court
expressly noted that attorney-client communications are protected by
the Fourth Amendment,160 and found that the attorneys had stated a
sufficient claim of a Fourth Amendment violation to survive a motion
to dismiss.

154

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the
prison cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells
simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and
objectives of penal institutions.”); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of
Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012) (holding that even detained arrestees have a
lesser expectation of privacy in arriving at jail).
155
Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143–44 (1962); see also In re State Police Litig.,
888 F. Supp. 1235, 1256 (D. Conn. 1995) (“[W]here conversations (in jail) consist of
privileged communications between clients and their attorneys, an expectation of
privacy is reasonable.”).
156
Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 419, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). This statement
may be contrasted with the BOP Regulation, which involves targeted rather than
routine monitoring.
157
See discussion supra Part II.
158
Lonegan, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 435.
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While some intrusive measures unique to prison life may lower an
attorney’s expectation of privacy while there—such as turning over a
cell phone or being subject to a pat-down—these measures should not
affect the attorney’s expectations with regard to his client
conversations.
First, the sacrosanct position of attorney-client
communications in the legal sphere militates in favor of the notion
that privacy and confidentiality will govern all such communications.161
As stated in Lanza, the attorney-client relationship is guarded with the
utmost protection, even or perhaps especially in jail. Second, the
intrusive measures taken in prisons are justified on the grounds of
physical safety and security, not obtainment of information for law
enforcement purposes. There is no increase in physical safety by the
surreptitious monitoring of privileged communications. As such, an
attorney retains the same expectation of privacy in a jail with regard to
her attorney-client communications as she does elsewhere.
In the case of Guantanamo habeas corpus attorneys, an attorney
has an even higher expectation of privacy when escorted to a private
interview room to meet her client, while receiving express assurances
that no surveillance is occurring within.162 Those assurances speak to
the reasonableness of the attorney’s subjective expectation of privacy,
and would certainly influence the reasonable person’s expectations
under the circumstances.
V. GOVERNMENT INTRUSION INTO ATTORNEY-CLIENT
COMMUNICATIONS VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY
RIGHTS OF THE ATTORNEY
Because traditional “standing” doctrine has been abrogated in
favor of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test,163 an attorney’s
right to assert a constitutional violation is not dependent on, or
derivative of, his client’s right to assert the same. Instead, so long as
the government actor has either violated an attorney’s reasonable
expectation of privacy or physically trespassed on an attorney’s
protected area or item, the attorney’s Fourth Amendment rights have
been violated. Said another way, government intrusion into attorney161

See Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1349 (M.D. Fl. 2012) (“No
reasonable attorney in Gennusa’s position would have expected that her conversations
with her client were being actively monitored and recorded when no officers were
present in the room.”).
162
See supra Part II.
163
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (“[W]e think the better analysis
forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined,
concept of standing.”).
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client communications violates the Fourth Amendment privacy rights
of the attorney under either the Katz invasion of privacy test or the Jones
trespass test.

A. The Katz Test—Subjective Expectation of Privacy
To reiterate, the Katz test requires that a government actor violate
a person’s subjective expectation of privacy, which is one that society
objectively recognizes as reasonable.164 Generally, a person manifests
her subjective expectation of privacy by taking actions that signal the
exclusion of others. Building a fence around one’s home,165 putting
up “No Trespassing” signs,166 and drawing the blinds167 have all been
held as sufficient manifestations of a subjective expectation of privacy.
As to papers specifically, a person may put private documents in a
locked briefcase168 or deposit box.169 For intangible papers like emails,
most people have the ability to password-protect their email
accounts.170 Taking additional steps like encryption171 or, in the special
case of attorneys, having a “confidentiality notice,”172 would likewise
suffice. As to verbal communications, actions like whispering, closing
the door, or asking others not to interrupt signal to the outside world
that the conversation about to take place is private.173 Indeed, closing
the phone booth door was all the proof the Supreme Court required
to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the Katz case
164

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
166
See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987).
167
See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that
no reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore no Fourth Amendment violation,
existed where defendant failed to draw the blinds and contraband was visible); United
States v. Wisniewski, 21 M.J. 370, 372 (C.M.A. 1986) (same); United States v. $61,433.04
U.S. Currency, 894 F. Supp. 906, 917 (E.D.N.C. 1995), aff’d sub nom., United States v.
Taylor, 90 F.3d 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (same).
168
See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980).
169
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, No. 88-6341, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 9628, at
*6 (6th Cir. July 5, 1989).
170
See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (comparing
password-protected files with a “locked footlocker” or other locked, personal
containers for Fourth Amendment purposes).
171
See, e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 412 (4th Cir. 2001) (likening encryption
to locked, personal containers and citing a Department of Justice manual indicating
that there can be no apparent authority to search encrypted or password-protected
emails).
172
See, e.g., Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 674 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110 (D.D.C.
2009) (finding confidentiality notice sufficient to manifest reasonable expectation of
privacy in attorney-client emails even though sent through employer email account).
173
In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
165
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itself.174
In the case of the Guantanamo attorneys, each of the lawyers
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy as to communications
with their clients in several ways. First, the attorneys were only allowed
to meet their clients in one closed, secure interrogation room in Camp
Echo.175 Second, the attorneys questioned multiple government
representatives regarding the security and privacy of the meeting
room, and were assured on multiple occasions that the meetings were
not being monitored.176 Third, the habeas attorneys were all directed
to use one allegedly secure server for sending and storing emails and
documents related to their representation. Many of the defense’s
emails and work-product documents disappeared from that secure
server.177 The government assured the attorneys that their documents
and emails were erroneously erased during a technical malfunction in
backing up the secure drive; coincidentally enough, however, none of
the government’s own emails or documents were deleted during this
process. Only defense documents disappeared. In sum, the
Guantanamo attorneys manifested a subjective expectation that their
client conversations—both in-person and remote—would remain
private.
B. The Katz Test—Objectively Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
There is simply no question that an objectively reasonable
expectation exists that attorney-client communications are not being
surreptitiously monitored by the government. Society at large must
expect attorney-client communications to be confidential, or else
attorneys would never be able to elicit sufficient facts from their clients
to adequately prepare a defense. The Supreme Court has noted the
damaging “chilling effect” on attorney-client communications that
would result if society did not have faith that attorneys keep mum
about clients’ business.178
The law is rife with language extolling the necessity of keeping
attorney-client communications confidential. As the Supreme Court
puts it, “[b]ecause of the significance of encourag[ing] the client to

174

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
DENBEAUX ET AL., SPYING ON ATTORNEYS, supra note 35, at 1.
176
Id. at 6.
177
Defense Motion to Abate, supra note 42.
178
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402–05 (1976) (attorney-client privilege
protects only those disclosures which might not have been made absent the privilege,
because the purpose of the privilege is to encourage confidential disclosures by a client
to an attorney).
175
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communicate fully and frankly with counsel, attorney-client
communications have been universally recognized as confidential—
even after the client’s death.”179 As one scholar writes, “the expectation
of privacy associated with [attorney-client communications] is more
than reasonable—it is necessary.”180 In addition to being the oldest of
all evidentiary privileges,181 the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
likewise
recognize
the
confidentiality
of
attorney-client
182
communications.
Even the far-reaching BOP Regulation requires
that the attorney be notified if monitoring is to take place.183 In fact,
violating attorney-client confidentiality is so egregious an offense to
our legal system that it per se represents a violation of the client’s Fifth
Amendment right to due process of law,184 as well as his Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.185 There is thus
no doubt that society is prepared to recognize an attorney’s
expectation that her client conversations are private.
In sum, the Guantanamo attorneys manifested a subjective
expectation that their client communications were private, which is an
expectation that society deems reasonable. As such, surreptitious
government monitoring of these conversations—after express
assurances that no monitoring was taking place, no less—constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search under the Katz test.
C. The Jones Trespass Test
Again, the Supreme Court held in Jones that whenever the
government physically intrudes on a constitutionally protected area or
item to obtain information for law enforcement or investigative
reasons, a Fourth Amendment search has occurred and a warrant is
required.186 Jones also clarified that a “seizure” of property occurs when
there is “some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory
interest” in that property.187 Under Jones, government surveillance of
attorney-client communications is a Fourth Amendment trespass on
two grounds.
First, the notes attorneys take during client
179

Swidler v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410–11 (1998) (emphasis added).
Cunningham & Srader, supra note 9, at 339.
181
FED. R. EVID. 501.
182
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2015).
183
28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(2) (2014).
184
Dobbins, supra note 12.
185
See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964). See also Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 419, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
186
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
187
Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 113 (1984)).
180
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conversations, as well as their emails or other correspondence relating
to the legal representation, are constitutionally protected “papers”
under the Fourth Amendment.188 The viewing and copying of attorney
notes via furtive digital video recording constitute a trespass search
under Jones. Likewise, the government’s surreptitious deletion of
attorney emails and work-product documents from the allegedly
secure server constitutes a “seizure.”189 Second, the designated room
in which attorneys meet their clients to have confidential and
privileged conversations is a constitutionally protected area.190 Much
like the “spike mikes” of generations past, the clandestine placement
of video cameras and microphones in the designated room where
attorneys meet their clients is a physical trespass into the intimate
papers, effects, and person of the attorney.
It is clear that the government interfered with Guantanamo
attorney-client communications for the illicit reason of “obtaining
information.”191 First, one of the stated purposes of recording attorneyclient conversations at Guantanamo Bay “was to assist in the
preparation of debriefing reports.”192 Second, multiple government
agencies have drafted reports based on the same attorney-client
recordings.193 Assuming, arguendo, that the eavesdropping was not for
law enforcement purposes, there is little value to listening-in on
attorney-client communications at Guantanamo beyond getting the
defense’s trial strategy. Such a purpose, of course, is no less illicit
under the Fourth Amendment because it is still a trespass on a
constitutionally protected area for the purpose of obtaining
information. Thus, whether the government’s actions at Guantanamo
vis-a-vis attorney-client communications are analyzed under the Katz
expectation of privacy test or the Jones trespass test, the result is the
same: the government is violating the Fourth Amendment.

188

See, e.g., United States v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
attorney-notes and other work product stored in a prison cell have a diminished
expectation of privacy, but that those stored elsewhere retain their constitutional
protections).
189
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (holding that a Fourth Amendment “seizure” occurs
whenever there is “meaningful interference with,” including taking possession of,
one’s property).
190
See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
191
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950.
192
DENBEAUX ET AL., SPYING ON ATTORNEYS, supra note 35, at 14 (quoting CIA
OFFICE, supra note 20, at 36).
193
DENBEAUX ET AL., SPYING ON ATTORNEYS, supra note 35, at 14 (comparing CIA
OFFICE, supra note 20, at 36, with AIR FORCE OFFICE, supra note 30, at 60).
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VI. CONGRESS SHOULD PASS LEGISLATION MAKING INVASION OF
PRIVACY A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION
This Comment has thus far identified a two-fold problem. First,
the federal government is spying on attorney-client communications at
Guantanamo and is very likely spying on Guantanamo attorneys’
private communications outside Guantanamo as well.194 Second,
currently available remedies are insufficient to either correct the
intrusions or incentivize the government to stay within constitutional
bounds. This Part details the insufficiency of current remedies and
proposes that the solution is Congressional action.
While Congress has permitted government surveillance of
attorney-client communications in some contexts, it nearly always
requires procedural safeguards like minimization procedures and ante
and post hoc judicial review.195 Yet, both the government surveillance
and the judicial review may be conducted permissibly in secret.196
Those who are able to discover the surveillance and seek redress for
the unconstitutional invasion of their privacy must file a Bivens action.
A Bivens action is an eponymous nod to the case that first
recognized a cause of action for constitutional violations by federal
actors, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics.197
By contrast, where constitutional violations are carried out by state or
municipal actors, aggrieved parties file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Historically, it made sense for Congress to provide a statutory cause of
action for state and municipal constitutional violations but not for
federal violations, as the general police power (and therefore the
majority of criminal process) was effected by state and municipal
actors. As the federal government becomes increasingly involved in
general police work, however—particularly in the booming arenas of
immigration, drug enforcement, cybercrimes, and terrorism—the
federal government’s accountability should increase proportionally.
Unlike a Section 1983 claim, liability under Bivens attaches only to
individual actors and not government agencies.198 This rule only
decreases an aggrieved attorney’s possibility of recovery. First, it may
be impossible to identify individual actors given the clandestine nature
of spying; indeed, it may even be impossible to name which agency the
agents work for, as plaintiff Bivens did.199 Second, there is no implied
194
195
196
197
198
199

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.D.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Id. at 396–97.
Id.
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private right of action under Bivens against private entities that engage
in alleged constitutional deprivations while acting under color of
federal law.200 As such, an aggrieved attorney could not sue, for
example, Hotmail, for turning over all of his emails to the government,
even if Hotmail violated the attorney’s Fourth Amendment rights in
doing so.
The biggest hurdle represented by Bivens actions, however, is the
judiciary itself. Jurists determining Bivens actions have unilaterally
denied Fourth Amendment claims based on government surveillance;
no person—attorney or otherwise—has succeeded on the merits in a
Fourth Amendment suit based on government surveillance.201 Federal
courts have only recognized that such a cause of action even exists four
times.202 At least empirically speaking, then, leaving our constitutional
right of privacy to the discretion of the judiciary in a Bivens action
seems imprudent.
Similarly, attorneys have not succeeded in actions asserting
violations of the federal statutes alleged to protect citizens’ privacy,
discussed in Part III, supra.203 Typically, courts dismiss actions by
attorneys on grounds of standing, asserting that any constitutional
violations that occur due to monitoring attorney-client
communications inure to the client.204 Courts have also dismissed
attorneys’ suits for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
200

See, e.g., Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277 (11th
Cir. 2012) (holding that employee could not sue government contractor employer
under Bivens for Fourth Amendment violations); Flores v. United States, 689 F.3d 894
(8th Cir. 2012) (holding that alien who died in federal custody while awaiting
deportation could not sue government contracted doctor or facility under Bivens).
201
At least, the author can find none in the federal courts.
202
See Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851 (RJL), 2013 WL 6571596 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
2013) (holding that content providers like Google and Yahoo have standing to
challenge NSA surveillance programs on Fourth Amendment grounds); Fazaga v.
F.B.I., 885 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that Muslims sufficiently
stated a Fourth Amendment violation based on unlawful police surveillance at their
mosque to survive a 12(b)(6) motion); Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (M.D.
Fl. 2012) (holding that attorney and client sufficiently stated a Fourth Amendment
violation based on unlawful police surveillance at the police department to survive a
12(b)(6) motion); Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 419, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same).
203
See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (holding
that attorneys had no standing to sue for Patriot Act violations stemming from NSA
warrantless wiretapping of calls with their international clients); ACLU Found. of S.
California v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that attorneys failed to
state a claim for Patriot Act violations where police intercepted attorney-client
communications pursuant to a FISC order regarding clients); Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft,
279 F. Supp. 2d 13, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that only client, not attorney, could
assert constitutional violations based on BOP Regulation monitoring).
204
See, e.g., Al-Owhali, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 26–27.
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Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting either that attorneys do not have
independent Fourth Amendment rights or that the surveillance was
pursuant to a valid (if secret) court order.205
Moreover, the courts charged with keeping the government’s
surveillance within constitutional bounds—the FISCs—have officially
held that secret, widespread, and non-targeted surveillance of
American citizens does not violate the Fourth Amendment.206 In
August 2013, however, FISC Chief Judge Reggie B. Walton
contradicted this official declaration. In a written statement to the
Washington Post, Chief Judge Walton asserted that the FISC lacks the
ability to independently verify how often government surveillance
violates court rules that protect citizens’ privacy and that the FISC
cannot check the veracity of the government’s assertions that the
violations its staff members report are unintentional mistakes.207
Instead, the “FISC is forced to rely upon the accuracy of the
information that is provided to the Court,” and “does not have the
capacity to investigate issues of noncompliance.”208 Indeed, a May 2012
internal audit revealed thousands of violations of FISC court orders
and rules per year.209 In sum, then, it appears that the judiciary has
neither the resources nor the willingness to provide an appropriate
level of protection for citizens’ constitutional rights in the face of
sweeping executive power to conduct secret surveillance.
Even if the judiciary were diligently guarding citizens from
unconstitutional government surveillance on a case-by-case basis, the
courts’ incremental, ad hoc response would remain an insufficient
check against the current, sweeping executive intrusions. Given the
judiciary’s paltry response, the legislature is the last resort upon which
we must call to keep the Executive in check. Congressional action is
the appropriate response because neither the Executive’s discretion
pre-surveillance nor the judiciary’s review post-surveillance has been
sufficient to protect citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. Indeed,
Congress is aware of the illegality of many federal surveillance
205
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programs.210 And while state law usually controls common law torts
such as invasion of privacy,211 federal law should proportionally expand
as the federal government increasingly intrudes on the privacy of
everyday citizens for general law enforcement purposes. Moreover,
Congress has the resources and expertise to hold hearings and make
findings in order to adopt the most effective procedural safeguards,
and still retains the surveillance capabilities necessary for the Executive
to secure our nation’s safety. Given their comparable structures,
Congress can even rely on state privacy statutes in drafting new
legislation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Government surveillance of average citizens is at best
objectionable, and more likely illegal and unconstitutional.
Government eavesdropping on attorney-client communications,
however, is a particularly egregious violation. Our legal system, as
embodied in the United States Constitution, was founded by men
diametrically opposed to government interference in everyday life.
The Fourth Amendment in particular was meant to stand as a bastion
against the government’s ability to rummage through our personal
effects, including our private correspondence. This Comment argues
that there is not, and should not be, a “criminal defense attorney”
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the government
should not be permitted to monitor a private citizen’s personal
communications simply because she has assumed legal representation
of a criminal defendant. Yet, protected by a deferential and submissive
judiciary, our federal agencies have been doing precisely that.
While this Comment provides evidence of government
surveillance of Guantanamo attorney-client communications, it is easy
to extrapolate the experience of Professor Denbeaux and his
Guantanamo colleagues to the average, stateside defense attorney.
Indeed, recent news headlines suggest that there is far more
surveillance being conducted than anyone without security clearance
can know. As attorneys, we know better than most the compelling
privacy interests at stake when government surveillance goes
unchecked. Lest the Fourth Amendment become a distant memory,
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it is time we call upon Congress to make unconstitutional, surreptitious
government surveillance a federal cause of action for invasion of
privacy.

